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Summary
In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski devel-
oped a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and 
relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian frame-
work, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the 
theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski 
to revise further Brentano’s theory. His changes concerned judgements about 
relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special 
cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements are analysed in a 
Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian 
way only as far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object:
the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of rela-
tionship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs 
for the object of (relational) judgements.
Introduction
Kazimierz Twardowski is known as the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw 
School, as the great inspirator of the ﬂ ourishing of Polish logic at 
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Warsaw, and Dr. Jan Siek, chief librarian of the Library of the Institute of Philosophy and 
Sociology of Warsaw University, for providing us with copies of the manuscript material and 
for allowing us to quote from it. We also thank Bjørn Jespersen and the anonymous referee 
for helping us with getting a better road. The initial version of this paper was submitted when 
Arianna Betti was a guest at the Faculty of Philosophy of Leiden University.
2the beginning of the twentieth century, and as a pupil of Franz Bren-
tano. When Twardowski left Vienna in 1895 for Lvov he had already 
improved upon the Brentanian theory of mental acts by giving the 
Bolzanian distinction between content and object pride of place in his 
Habilitationsschrift, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstel-
lungen (1894). Zur Lehre, however, contains very little on the theory of 
judgement, a central theme in Brentanian logic, as acts of judgements 
are the bearers of truth and falsity.
Later, in a famous letter to Meinong, Twardowski says that he is 
working on a theory of judgement (Twardowski 1897b), and there are 
several manuscripts written in the period between 1894 and 1897 that 
concern this topic. The question we are concerned with in this paper 
is: what theory of judgement did Twardowski develop during that 
period?
Two of the manuscripts are in Polish, the short Teoria s?dów (The-
ory of Judgement, Twardowski 1897a) and the much longer Logika
(Twardowski 1895/6), containing the lecture notes for a course on logic 
given during his ﬁ rst year in Lvov; a third, important one is in German. 
This German manuscript, Logik (Twardowski 1894/95), is a parallel to 
the lecture notes in Polish; it collects the lecture notes for a course on 
logic given in Vienna. In the present paper we take as a starting-point the 
last manuscript because it contains the most original ideas of the three. 
This is probably due to the fact that the Vienna students were already 
familiar with the Brentanian framework, while in Lvov Twardowski 
had to start ab ovo (Ingarden 1938: 25 ff.).1
The manuscripts show that in the years 1894 through 1897 
Twardowski provides an improvement of Brentano’s theory of judge-
ment: not all judgements are existential, as Brentano thought. According 
to Twardowski, a strictly existential theory of judgement can account 
neither for judgements that have relations as objects, nor for judgements 
about the past. Twardowski seems to solve this problem by acknowl-
edging states of affairs as objects of these judgements.
1. The Polish manuscript Logika (Twardowski 1895/6) is being currently edited by 
Arianna Betti, the German one by Arianna Betti and Venanzio Raspa. A fourth manuscript 
on relations (Twardowski 1893) seems to be a preparation for Zur Lehre.
31. The Brentanian Concept of Judgement
In his Psychologie from 1874, Brentano presents a theory of judgment 
in which he acknowledges two types of judgemental act, afﬁ rmation 
and denial. Judgements get their objects by an underlying act of pre-
sentation: anything that may be an object of presentation may be an 
object of judgement. According to Brentano, judgements do not have 
a subject-predicate structure. In a judgement we either afﬁ rm or deny 
the existence of an object, and therefore all judgements have the exis-
tential form ‘A exists’ or ‘A does not exist’. ‘Existence’ is here to be 
understood not as a predicate, but as part of the judgemental act. In 
a categorical judgement such as ‘A person is ill’ the object afﬁ rmed 
is a complex, namely an ill person (Brentano 1874: II, 56). With the 
afﬁ rmation of the complex object, the ‘subject’ is implicitly afﬁ rmed 
(Brentano 1874: II, 58). A universal judgement, like ‘Every triangle 
is a ﬁ gure’, does not implicitly afﬁ rm that there are triangles, as such 
a judgement is taken to be a negative existential judgement; what is 
negated is a triangle that is not a ﬁ gure.2
A Brentanian theory of judgement along these lines we also ﬁ nd in 
Twardowski’s Zur Lehre. Notwithstanding his Brentanian background 
and his loyalty to the spirit of the Brentanian enterprise, Twardowski’s 
philosophical construction has also much of its own. Twardowski’s ﬁ rst 
step away from a Brentanian theory of mental acts consists in the dis-
tinction he makes between the content and the object of an act borrowed 
from Bolzano. As is well known, for Brentano the object to which we 
are directed in an act is an object immanent to the act, also called the 
content of the act (Brentano 1874: I, 124, 125). For Twardowski, the 
object to which we are directed is not the object immanent to the act, 
but the object taken to be independent of the act (Twardowski 1894: 
4), which may be the object of different acts with different contents. 
To use Twardowski’s example, Salzburg may be the object of the act of 
presentation whose content is the birthplace of Mozart, or it may also 
be the object of the act of presentation whose content is the town that 
lies at the place of the Roman Juvavum. Such presentations that share 
their object Twardowski calls Wechselvorstellungen, using a term from 
Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre (Twardowski 1894: 32). The distinction 
2. For a more extended presentation of Brentano’s theory of judgement see Brandl 
(2002).
4between content and object is also of use in semantics. The content 
the birthplace of Mozart is the meaning of the name ‘the birthplace of 
Mozart’; its object, i. e. what is named by it, is Salzburg (Twardowski 
1894: 11, 12). Despite the references to Bolzano, with this distinction 
Twardowski stays within a Brentanian framework, because he acknowl-
edges not only a content, but also an object for every act. Unlike Bol-
zano, Twardowski assumes that the act in which we present a round 
square has both a content and an object, where the content exists as a 
dependent part of the act. The question whether the object exists is not 
relevant as far as presentations are concerned; it may not exist, as in 
the example just given (Twardowski 1894: 30). Further, the content of 
the act in which a golden mountain is presented is not golden; such a 
property is to be attributed to the object, not to the content (Twardowski 
1894: 31).
Although Zur Lehre is not devoted to judgements, Twardowski 
extends the distinction between content and object also to judgemental 
acts. That which is afﬁ rmed or rejected in the judgement ‘A is’ (or ‘A is 
not’) is the object A; it is that to which we are directed in our judgement. 
The content of an afﬁ rmative judgement is the existence of the object 
A, while the content of a negative judgement is the non-existence of 
it (Twardowski 1894: 9; cf. Brentano 1889a: 27). The two judgements 
‘The birthplace of Mozart exists’ and ‘The town that lies at the place of 
the Roman Juvavum exists’ get their object, namely Salzburg, through 
the underlying act of presentation. The contents of the two judgements 
differ as much as the contents of the underlying presentations differ. It is 
not the content that is afﬁ rmed (or denied) in a judgement, however: the 
object afﬁ rmed in both judgements is Salzburg itself. The content of the 
judgements, respectively, the existence of the birthplace of Mozart and 
the existence of the town that lies at the place of the Roman Juvavum,
has some similarity with a propositional entity. However, as we will 
discuss later at the end of section 4, it cannot be called a proposition 
straight away.
2. Twardowski’s Problems with Brentano’s Theory
Twardowski’s introduction of the content/object distinction in Bren-
tano’s theory of judgement has problematic consequences discussed 
already in Zur Lehre. In a crucial passage Twardowski says:
5the question of whether the terms of a relation exist or do not exist is 
completely irrelevant so far as the relation which ‘obtains’ between them 
is concerned, as Hoeﬂ er has shown. He does, however, make the mistake 
of confusing the content with the object of the presentation. He says: A 
judgment which asserts a relation does not assume a ‘real’ existence of the 
terms of the relation; it is sufﬁ cient to have a presentation of these terms, 
and the judgment then concerns these contents. This seems to be incorrect 
in as much as the contents of presentations do exist, but do not constitute 
the terms of the relation which is asserted in the judgment. If one says that 
the number four is greater than the number three, then one does not talk 
about a relation between the content of the presentation of three and the 
content of the presentation of four; for there are no relations of magnitude 
between contents. Rather, the relation occurs between ‘the number three’ 
and ‘the number four’, both taken as objects of presentations, regardless of 
whether they exist or not, if they are only presented through corresponding
presentations (Twardowski 1894: 27; 1977: 24, 25).
In this passage Twardowski follows explicitly the Logik of the Brenta-
nians Meinong and Höﬂ er, but only in part, as for him relations do not 
obtain between contents, but between objects of presentations. Relations 
are not essentially dependent upon the mind; they belong to the realm 
of objects. Twardowski’s thesis that relations belong to the realm of 
objects immediately brings him into conﬂ ict with the Brentanian thesis 
that everything that is judged is a simple or complex object:
If this is so, then there arises another difﬁ culty which was already pointed 
out by Hoeﬂ er. Relation-judgments which are about the existence of a rela-
tion between non-existing objects seem to afﬁ rm the objects themselves; 
and according to what was said earlier about the relationship between the 
afﬁ rmation of parts and the afﬁ rmation of the whole containing these parts, 
the afﬁ rmation of a relation must involve the afﬁ rmation of every term of 
this relation (Twardowski 1894: 27, 28; 1977: 25).3
In these two passages the term ‘relation’ carries a fundamental ambi-
guity. The relation in the latter passage has to be taken as a complex. 
Here the relation is a whole consisting of its members (terms), and not 
something between them; the members of the relation are conceived 
of as parts of this whole. In the ﬁ rst passage, instead, it seems that we 
have to take relation as a relation in the strict sense, that is, an object 
3. The passage Twardowski mentions is to be found at Twardowski 1894: 8.
6that obtains between its members, irrespective of the existence of the 
latter, and which in the further sections of Zur Lehre is called a formal
part of a complex object (Twardowski 1894: 48, 51). Twardowski is 
convinced that if relations obtain between objects, and not contents, then 
the mereological thesis defended in the second passage — i. e. that the 
afﬁ rmation of the whole implies the afﬁ rmation of its parts — creates a 
problem. The question whether the existence of a relation requires the 
existence of its members is of great importance for Twardowski. The 
thesis of the intentionality of the act is interpreted by him such that there 
is a relation between the act of presentation and its object. He wants to 
prevent that the existence of this relation implies the existence of the 
(presented) object. As we have seen, for Twardowski it is possible that 
the object of an act of presentation may not exist.
The problem of relations as objects of judgements is relevant, 
because Twardowski considers, differently from Brentano, universal 
categorical judgements like ‘All radii of a circle are of the same length’ 
to afﬁ rm a relation. Still, Twardowski gives a solution within the Bren-
tanian framework to the problem raised by these judgements. Such 
judgements do not implicitly afﬁ rm the existence of the radii, because 
a universal judgement is a denial according to the existential theory 
of judgement. Such a judgement rejects the inequality of the radii of 
a circle. Since the relation (as a complex) is denied, its members are 
not afﬁ rmed. So there seems to be still a solution within the existential 
framework. Judgements like ‘Poseidon is the god of the sea’ are not 
universal judgements, though. For this kind of judgements Twardowski 
resorts to a solution he ﬁ nds in Hillebrand’s textbook of Brentanian 
logic (1891): a relation is afﬁ rmed between Poseidon and the sea, but 
one of the members is not Poseidon as such, but Poseidon as named 
(Twardowski 1894: 28), which does exist.
Whether or not Twardowski is right that ‘All radii of a circle are of 
the same length’ and ‘Poseidon is the god of the sea’ must be taken as 
being about a relation, he cannot apply the same solution he proposes 
in Zur Lehre to all relational judgements. A judgement about a relation 
between an act of presentation and a (presented) object is not a universal 
judgement, nor is it of the type ‘Poseidon is the God of the sea’. In the 
presentation of this relation I am not directed to the object as named, but 
to the Vorstellungsgegenstand schlechthin. What, though, if this object 
does not exist? All in all, Twardowski has not found a general solution 
within a Brentanian theory of judgement to the problem whether a rela-
7tional object of judgement can exist while its members do not exist.
A similar problem emerges in connection with judgements about past 
objects, for which Brentano’s theory is inadequate. In his Logik 1894/5 
Twardowski mentions the problem explicitly. Consider the judgements
(1) God exists
(2) Once there was a king.
In the ﬁ rst case the content of the judgement is existence; what in the 
second? Many, like Prof. Brentano himself, think that also here existence 
is the content. But this cannot be the case. For: once there was a king = 
+ a past king. Past = having existed, but not existing anymore. Thus the 
judgement seems to claim something contradictory (Twardowski 1894/5: 
32v).4
According to Brentano a past object is unreal (Brentano 1890/91: 94); 
but this does not exclude that a past object exists. For, according to 
Brentano’s theory of judgement, if a past object is an object of a true 
judgement, then it exists. And here ‘exists’ must mean ‘exists presently 
(now, actually)’. The latter is a consequence that orthodox Brentanians 
have denied (Hillebrand 1891: 54), but it derives from at least three 
aspects of Brentano’s theory: his theory of judgment, as just mentioned; 
the identiﬁ cation of content and object, as the content surely exists 
whenever we present something; and Brentano’s interpretation of the 
adjective ‘present’. As regards the latter, a present object N does not 
have any determination which enriches it, so it does not differ from N 
itself (Brentano 1890/91: 94). This argument has a perfect counterpart 
in Brentano’s interpretation of ‘existing’: an existing N does not dif-
fer from N itself (Brentano 1874: II, 49; cf. Hillebrand 1891: 24, 25). 
Twardowski correctly agrees with the reading of ‘exists’ as ‘exists pres-
ently’, but no less correctly disagrees with Brentano that past objects 
do exist. Since past (and future, we can infer) objects are non-existing, 
the problem of judgements involving such objects is similar to the one 
of relations with non-existing members.
4. “Zum ersten Fall ist der Inhalt des Urteils die Existenz; was im zweiten? Viele, wie 
Prof. Br[entano] selbst, meinen, auch da sei Existenz der Inhalt. Aber das geht nicht. Denn: 
[---] ein[st] war ein König = +einen gewesenen König. Gewesen = existiert haben, aber jetzt 
nicht mehr existierend. Also scheint das Urteil etwas widersprechendes zu behaupten.” This 
passage — crossed out in the original — has been amended in connection with p. 119, where 
Twardowski elaborates on this view.
8Twardowski’s problems, in sum, come from the fact that he accepts 
the basics of Brentano’s existential theory, takes existence as spatio-tem-
poral presence, and that he follows the Bolzanian distinction between 
content and object, together with a very broad notion of object. His 
general point is, as we shall see, that categorical judgements involving 
a non-existing object cannot be about the existence of a complex.
3. Twardowski’s Solution
Twardowski’s answer to the deﬁ ciencies of Brentano’s theory in the 
manuscripts is quite different from the answer he gives in Zur Lehre. In 
his Logik 1894/5 he states that there are two types of judgements, exis-
tential judgements and relational judgements; most of our judgements 
are relational ones. The terms ‘existential judgement’ and ‘relational 
judgement’ may be misleading, because the term ‘existential’ is derived 
from the content, whereas the term ‘relational’ is derived from the object
of the judgement. A judgement is either the afﬁ rmation or denial of an 
object, or else the afﬁ rmation or denial of a relationship (Verhältnis). In 
both cases there is something, for which Twardowski uses the determin-
able term ‘es gibt’: in the case of an existential judgement, an object is 
afﬁ rmed (or denied) — and the content of the judgement is existence. 
Its form is: ± e A, where ‘+’ stands for the act of afﬁ rmation, ‘–’ for 
the act of denial, ‘e’ for existence, and ‘A’ is a schematic letter for a 
term that stands for the object. In the case of a relational judgement, 
a relationship is afﬁ rmed (or denied) — and the content is subsistence
(Vorhandensein, Bestehen). Its form is ± b A, where ‘b’ stands for ‘das
Bestehen’ (Twardowski 1894/5: 32v).5 In this case ‘A’ is a schematic 
letter for a term that stands for a relationship.
5. “Die zwei Arten des Inhalt<s> fassen wir unter den Namen des Vorhandenseins (es 
gibt, es gibt nicht) zusammen; er umfaßt sowol das Existieren, als das Bestehen. Beiden 
gemeinsam das Merkmal des objectiven Zwanges, das sie auf unsere Urteile ausüben, und 
demzufolge wir sie anerkennen müssen. Die eine Anerkennung bedeutet aber Existenz, die 
andere ein Vorhandensein: Allgemein ±A: speciell ±e A ±b A.” The idea that an objective 
force is characteristic of a judgement can also be found in Sigwart and it is criticised by 
Brentano (Brentano 1889b: 66 ff.). Twardowski certainly knew Sigwart’s psychologistic logic 
because it is mentioned in the letter to Meinong, where he uses Sigwart’s term ‘objective 
validity’, instead of ‘objective force’, and because this logic was widespread at the end of 
the nineteenth century. See also section 4.
9Interestingly, Twardowski no longer follows Brentano in his analysis 
of universal categorical judgements. A judgement such as ‘Two inﬁ nitely 
long parallel lines do not intersect’ is not a negation, but an afﬁ rmation 
of a relationship, which does not imply that such lines exist. In general, 
an S-P judgement is a relational judgement, its object is a relationship, 
and it may or may not presuppose (voraussetzen) the existence of an 
S. The judgement as such does not differ in the two cases. Notice, in 
connection with this, that Twardowski in the Logik criticises Brentano’s 
attempt to introduce Doppelurteile (Brentano 1883: 194). There are not 
two judgements present in the judgement ‘S is P’ (Twardowski 1894/5: 
198, 199). Judgements such as ‘This …’, ‘He …’ or ‘Josef …’ normally 
presuppose that the object named by the subject exists, but not always. 
Besides, a name in subject-position cannot be used to make an assertion. 
All categorical judgements are judgements about a relation; moreover, 
also hypothetical judgements are categorical, and therefore relational 
judgements (Twardowski 1894/5, 124).
Twardowski is here not only indebted to Brentano, but also to 
Bolzano. For Twardowski, the general form of a declarative sentence 
expressing a relational judgement is ‘A has b’ (“Die allgemeine Form 
der Beziehungssätze: A hat b”, Twardowski 1894/5: 139; cf. Bolzano 
1837: §127). The object of all types of relational judgements are trans-
latable into the form the having of a quality by an object, without loss 
of meaning. The object is
the relationship between an object and a quality belonging to it, the rela-
tionship which consists in a quality belonging to an object, in an object 
having a quality. (Twardowski 1894/5: 132v).6
For example, instead of asserting that ‘Between A and B there is the 
relation of cause and effect’, we may say ‘A has the quality of effecting 
B’. (Twardowski 1894/5: 135). The content of relational jugdements 
is the (non-)subsisting of a relationship of having of a quality b by the 
object A (Twardowski 1894/5: 140).
An interesting kind of non-existents in Twardowski’s conception 
are, as we saw, past objects, since existence is conceived as spatio-
6. “[D]as Verhältniß zwischen einem Gegenstand und einer ihm zukommenden Bes-
chaffenheit, das Verhältniß, das darin besteht, daß einem Gegenstand eine Beschaffenheit 
zukommt, daß ein Gegenstand eine Beschaffenheit hat. […] <Wir> wollen es einfach als das 
Verhältniß des Habens einer Beschaffenheit bezeichnen.”
10
temporal presence. That past objects do not exist is also clariﬁ ed in a 
section of Logik in which Twardowski says that proper names can be 
used to refer to people who passed away (Twardowski 1894/5: 200, 
201).7 The problem of judgements about non-present objects as a special 
kind of non-existents is a strong reason for Twardowski to acknowl-
edge another type of judgement next to existential ones (Twardowski 
1894/5: 119). If ‘Once there was a king’ is not to be contradictory, the 
content of this judgement cannot be the existence of an object. There 
must be judgements whose content is “the subsistence of a relation-
ship, without consideration for the existence of the members of the 
relationship” (Twardowski 1894/5, 32v).8 Existing can be only objects 
which come into and go out of being; subsisting, on the contrary, are 
unchanging objects with no temporal determinations; relationships are 
construed as timeless objects whose ‘members’ may be objects which 
are past. Twardowski’s position is that all sentences with an occurrence 
of the verb ‘to exist’ or similar in a non-present tense do not express an 
existential judgement; they express the subsistence of a relationship. 
Besides judgements about present tense existence, only those weather 
(‘it hails’), impersonal (‘it’s hot in here’), and subjectless (predicate-
less) sentences (‘Bomb!’) whose object is said to exist now, express 
existential judgements. Sentences like ‘It rained’ and ‘It was hot in 
there’, instead, do not express existential judgements, but relational 
ones. For, according to Twardowski, while the content of ‘God exists’ 
is the existence of God, the content of ‘Once there was a king’ is the 
subsistence of the relation of contemporaneousness between a king and 
a certain period of time in the past. Or, more properly, the subsistence of 
a relation of having between a king and a quality of being contemporary 
with a certain time-section in the past. By taking relationships as objects 
of such judgements Twardowski’s theory offers also a solution to the 
problem with time left open by Brentano’s theory mentioned above.
7. In the passage he classiﬁ es names according to the existence of their objects: there are 
names meaning something such that we can infer that their objects do not exist; names mean-
ing something such that we cannot infer that the objects do or do not exist; names meaning 
something such that we can infer that the objects exist. In the second group fall most of the 
names, including proper names which can be used to indicate someone who no longer lives, 
like ‘Roderick Chisholm’ and ‘Giambattista Vico’. In the ﬁ rst group fall ‘round square’, 
‘golden mountain’, while in the third group falls only ‘I’ (cf. Russell 1910/11: 121).
8. “Also nicht immer Existenz im eigentlichen Sinne Inhalt des Urteils, sondern auch 
das Bestehen einer Beziehung, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob die Glieder der Beziehung selbst 
existieren.” (Twardowski 1894/5, 32v).
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4. Relations, Complexes, Sachverhalte
Twardowski’s solution largely consists in introducing a special notion, 
subsistence, in order to prevent that the existence of a relationship brings 
with it the existence of its members. Relations in Zur Lehre could not 
exist without its members, but in the manuscripts they can subsist irre-
spective of whether its members exist or not. Is Twardowski’s solution 
just an easy, cosmetic way-out, or is there something more to it? The 
answer to this question depends largely on what Twardowski means by 
his new notion of relationship as object of relational judgement. What 
kind of object is it? Is it a state of affairs? It is not uncommon to speak 
about the obtaining (das Bestehen) of states of affairs rather than their 
existence (Existenz), because states of affairs are ideal, propositionally 
structured entities. Existence is preferably used for objects in space and 
time. It is tempting to say that what Twardowski spotted in Zur Lehre
was indeed something similar to a state of affairs, that we see in full 
action only later in the manuscripts. This would be what makes his 
solution attractive, at least to friends of states of affairs. It is plausible 
that the reason why Twardowski got into trouble in Zur Lehre is that 
he did not have the tools, at that stage, to distinguish among relations, 
complexes, and ﬁ nally states of affairs as objects of judgement. These 
distinctions were still in ﬁ eri. Incidentally, let us note that Twardowski 
in Zur Lehre had also adjunctive problems on relations in the strict 
sense, caused by his peculiar mereological analyses, which, notoriously, 
Husserl found (correctly) indigestible (Husserl 1900/01: B1 280; see 
also Rosiak 1998: 87). Besides, the Brentanian inﬂ uence was still too 
strong to allow Twardowski to make a decisive turn towards an ontol-
ogy of states of affairs.
In the letter to Meinong previously mentioned, Twardowski says 
about the new theory of judgement he is working on:
The main idea I have is: in every judgement we may distinguish 1. act 
(afﬁ rmation or denial) 2. content: the existing, the being there, the subsist-
ing (Das Existieren, Vorhandensein, Bestehen) 3. object (the judged state of 
affairs (der beurteilte Sachverhalt) = either an absolute datum or a relation 
or both together) Example: ‘God exists’: object: God; content: existence; 
act: afﬁ rmation.9 Or ‘Two times two is four’: object: equality between the 
9. We amended the German text on the basis of the original manuscript letter. Kindinger 
wrongly reads ‘Beziehung’ (relation) instead of ‘Bejahung’ (afﬁ rmation).
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product of two times two and four; content: the existence (subsistence) 
of this equality. Act: afﬁ rmation.9 I believe to attain two things with this 
theory: 1. A liberation for all theories of judgement of the unclarity that 
pertains to the concept of existence, 2. A uniﬁ cation of the Brentano-Mei-
nong-Höﬂ er-theory with the theory of Sigwart, where these three moments 
(act, content, object) are clearly distinguished (act = consciousness; content 
= objective validity; object: that what, according to Sigwart, is uniﬁ ed in 
the presentations (Twardowski 1897b: 143, 144).
This passage conﬁ rms what we found in the manuscripts: next to 
existential judgements, Twardowski acknowledges also relational 
judgements, which are judgements about a relation whose existence/
subsistence we accept or reject. However, the passage does not settle 
the matter whether a relationship is a Sachverhalt beyond doubt. What 
does ‘Sachverhalt’ mean in the passage above? From the examples 
we cannot decide that it is the technical notion of Sachverhalt, as it 
was later to be used by Husserl and Reinach. It is not unlikely that 
Twardowski knew of a technical use of the term ‘Sachverhalt’, namely 
as the term was used by Stumpf (Stumpf 1888: 242), whose course in 
1892 Twardowski followed (Twardowski 1926: 8). But Twardowski’s 
use of the term is certainly different, as Stumpf employs the term for 
the content of a judgement. Following the quotation, we can say that a 
Sachverhalt is simply a presented object (‘absolute datum’), a relation, 
or a relation together with its relata.
To decide whether Twardowski’s relationship is a state of affairs we 
need some preliminary terminological and conceptual clariﬁ cations con-
cerning relation, complex, Sachverhalt and cognate notions. Most of 
this conceptual apparatus comes from the Austrian tradition, especially 
from Meinong. Meinong is of considerable relevance in this context. 
First, he takes over two important theses from Twardowski, namely that 
there are objects which do not exist, and that non-existing objects may 
have properties. Secondly, it is Meinong who, among the Brentanians, 
was most involved in the theory of relations: we ﬁ nd relations as objects 
of categorical judgements both in the Logik written with Höﬂ er (Höﬂ er 
& Meinong 1890: 97), and, most important, in his review of Hillebrand’s 
militant book of Brentanian logic (Meinong 1892: 453).
If the individual object a stands in the relation R to the individual 
object b (for instance, a is a friend of b), we can distinguish at least 
three different kinds of entities. First, there is the particular relation R
of friendship between a and b. What relates a and b is not a universal, 
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repeatable entity; this relation is as particular as the related members. 
Secondly, there is the complex a-in-the-relation-of-similarity-to-b, a 
whole of which a and b are parts related by R. Finally, there is the 
state of affairs that a is a friend of b, a’s being a friend of b, a’s hav-
ing friendship with b. What is the difference among these three kinds 
of entities?
According to Meinong, whenever there is a relation R between a
and b, there is also a complex made up of a and b in virtue of this very 
same relation R: Wo Relation, da Komplexion, and vice versa. This is 
what Meinong called the Partialkoinzidenz-Prinzip between relations 
and complexes. The complex is not a collection (Kollektiv) of a, b and 
R, but a unitary whole ‘glued together’ by R; and while R is a mode of 
union of a complex, it is never a constituent part (Bestandstück) of it 
(Meinong 1899: 389–391; Findlay 1963: 95, 145). What the principle 
grants us is that in the case of existing complexes, the state of affairs
(Objektiv in Meinong) that the complex a-in-relation-R-to-b exists and 
the state of affairs that the relation R subsists between a and b are dif-
ferent but equivalent.
But why is a state of affairs different from a complex? A state of 
affairs is not a complex because it is not taken to have constituents in 
any appreciable sense in which a complex has parts. The difference 
between a complex and a state of affairs is probably best grasped when 
we say that a complex whose parts a and b — related by a suitable rela-
tion — exist, exists as well, while a state of affairs whose ‘constituents’ a
and b exist, at most subsists or obtains. This means that a state of affairs, 
in contrast to a complex, is essentially an ideal object, beyond space 
and time. A state of affairs is a special object in which a, b and R are, 
say, reticulated together.10 A state of affairs is a relationally articulated 
object, but it is not a relation, whether universal or particular, as this 
articulation involves the relata as well. The German name for a state 
of affairs, ‘Sachverhalt’, better expresses the relational status of it (cf. 
Mulligan 1985: 145). Further, a state of affairs is to be distinguished 
from a particular property, or moment, such as the particular redness of 
some particular rose, and it is also to be distinguished from a particular 
relation, or relational moment, such as the friendship between a and b.
Such moments are as particular as the objects whose properties they 
are; they exist in space and time as dependent entities.
10. The term is Barry Smith’s, cf. Smith 1989: 421.
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A state of affairs is, however, not only to be distinguished from a 
relation, a complex and a moment, but also from a proposition. Many 
Austrians did not make this distinction. For example, for Meinong, the 
Objectiv has characteristics of both states of affairs and propositions. It 
is understandable that the distinction is neglected, because both types 
of entities are propositionally articulated, and thus named by nominal-
izations of declarative sentences. Where we are now used to name a 
proposition by a that-clause, such a clause can also be used to name a 
state of affairs: that the knife is on the table is a fact (a state of affairs 
that obtains). But, whereas a proposition is a homogeneous meaning-
entity, whose parts are meaning-entities themselves, a state of affairs 
is not a homogeneous entity. The latter is, for example, conceived of 
as built out of objects like tables and mountains, on the one hand, and 
universals, on the other hand. But, whatever objects are involved in a 
state of affairs, the state of affairs itself is outside space and time. One 
of the weaker points of a theory of states of affairs, therefore, is that 
it is left unexplained how objects in space and time can ‘constitute’ 
an object outside space and time. A state of affairs cannot be a whole 
with, for instance, a mountain as a part. We may have states of affairs 
whose ‘constituting’ objects are no longer there. Further, propositions 
and states of affairs can be distinguished by the different roles they 
may play. While a proposition is given the role of the content of judge-
ment, a state of affairs is given the role of the object of judgement; 
where propositions are often given the role of truth-bearer, states of 
affairs are given the role of truth-maker. ‘The existence of a’, which is 
used by Brentano and Twardowski for the judgemental content, is less 
appropriate for expressing a state of affairs or a proposition, because 
there is no verb present; ‘the existence of a’ has a form similar to ‘the 
redness of a’, which is used for moments in space and time. A state of 
affairs is distinguished from a moment not only by its being an ideal 
entity, but also by the special syntactic structure it has, comparable to 
the structure of a proposition, as we have seen above. Because of this 
syntactic structure, a state of affairs is most aptly named by a nominal-
ization of a declarative sentence: that a is b, or, preferably, a’s being b,
so that the that-clause can be used for propositions. The linguistic form 
the being b of a, which is similarly a nominalization of a sentence, we 
also consider to be apt for expressing a state of affairs.
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5. Twardowski and the Sachverhalt
Is then a relationship (Verhältnis) a state of affairs for Twardowski? 
Unfortunately, when speaking of relations, Twardowski fails to provide 
us with the distinctions which we would need, both in Zur Lehre and 
in the manuscripts. Besides, in the manuscripts Twardowski no longer 
offers the complicated analyses of relations and complexes we ﬁ nd in 
Zur Lehre. But, clearly, he no longer construes the object of a relational 
judgement, a relationship, as a complex with its members as parts. What 
does Twardowski mean then, when he claims in his Logik 1894/5 that 
the object of the judgement ‘The apple is ripe’ is the relation of having 
the quality of ripeness by the apple? There are three arguments for the 
claim that Twardowski’s relation of having a quality by an object is a 
state of affairs.
The ﬁ rst is that the object of the judgement cannot just be the relation 
between the apple and its ripeness, because the mere relation does not 
involve the relata as such. Apparently, for Twardowski, the object of a 
relational judgement is a relationship, which is the having of ripeness 
by the apple, the apple and the ripeness included. This argument is not 
decisive, though: the ‘relationship’ can be interpreted as a complex as 
well.
The second favourable argument is that the relation of having the 
quality of ripeness by the apple subsists timelessly even if the objects 
pass away. The having by the apple of the quality of ripeness, the 
apple’s being ripe, cannot be, for instance, the particular ripeness of 
the apple, a moment that exists and is destroyed when the apple is 
eaten. For the same reason it cannot be a relational moment. Like in 
Meinong, existence of objects and subsistence of relationships should 
be kept strictly apart. For Meinong, the subsistence of the objective is 
in no way dependent upon the existence of its object (Meinong 1904: 
495); as for Twardowski, an object may be said to have a property even 
if the object does not exist. Sachverhalte may then be said to subsist, 
whereas their reticulata do not exist. By this criterion, Twardowski’s 
relational objects are states of affairs.
The third argument for the thesis that Twardowski’s relationship is a 
state of affairs comes from the way he names a relationship. Twardowski 
uses the form ‘the having of b by a’ to express the general form of objects 
of relational judgements. In section 4 we said that such a nominalization 
of a sentence is most apt for expressing a state of affairs. Twardowski’s 
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choice of expression might indicate that he meant the object of rela-
tional judgements to be a state of affairs (here the difference between 
‘the having of b by a’ and ‘the being b of a’ is not relevant). In Logika
1895/6 we ﬁ nd the expression ‘the rising of the sun’ as a name for the 
object of the judgement ‘the sun rises’ (Twardowski 1895/6: 91). The 
expression ‘the rising of the sun’ is clearly different from the expres-
sion ‘the rising sun’; the latter denotes nothing but a complex object. 
Twardowski rarely uses a that-clause to name a relationship, and never 
in a technical way.
We may note that Twardowski, instead, uses a that-clause for the 
content in a considerable amount of cases, but only in the Polish Logika
(Twardowski 1895/6: 90, 91). For Twardowski, we have seen, the stan-
dard form of the content of a judgement is ? es gibt (A); that is, ‘the 
(non-)existence of A’ — or ‘the (non-)subsistence of A’, in the case of 
relational judgements. For Twardowski the judgemental content func-
tions as the meaning of a sentence, which is one of the characteristics 
of a proposition. Nevertheless, for him a proposition is neither a truth-
bearer nor an entity independent of the act.
There are also some important arguments against the thesis that 
Twardowski’s relationships are states of affairs. Twardowski does 
not discuss the ontological status of a relationship to any satisfactory 
degree. And, he does not use the word ‘Sachverhalt’ in any technical 
sense. This conﬁ rms that the use of Sachverhalt in the letter to Mei-
nong is also not technical. It would certainly be exaggerated to say that 
Twardowski has a theory of relationships; for instance, he gives no 
identity criterion for them. Do judgements such as ‘a is bigger than b’
and ‘b is smaller than a’ have the same relationship as object? Contrary 
to what Meinong and Husserl were to claim, for both Brentano and 
Twardowski a judgmental act is dependent upon an act of presentation 
of the very same object. This means that a judged relationship is also 
an object of an act of presentation, and there is thus no special object 
of judgement. Further, even if relationships are states of affairs, they 
cannot be negative. There is not a relationship expressed by ‘a’s not 
being b’. For both Brentano and Twardowski, negation has its place 
on the side of the act. Twardowski also acknowledges negation in the 
content, but as derived from the quality of the act. A difference with 
other ontologies of Sachverhalte, like Husserl’s and Meinong’s (but not 
a disadvantage ), is also that the object of a judgement such as ‘God 
exists’ is, exactly like in Brentano, God itself, and not a special object 
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such as that God exists or God’s being (there). Finally, the relation 
between the relationship and its ‘parts’ or reticulata is not explained by 
Twardowski. Failure to explain this relation seems, however, a general 
problem of theories of states of affairs, more than an argument against 
reading Twardowski’s concept of relationships as a concept of states 
of affairs.
There are differences, then, between Twardowski’s relationships and 
some standard ways of conceiving states of affairs; however, these dif-
ferences are not relevant enough to consider Twardowski’s relationships 
a fourth notion next to relation, complex and state of affairs. Also, a 
theory like Twardowski’s would not gain from keeping relationships 
separate from states of affairs. On the contrary, the identiﬁ cation of 
Twardowski’s relationships with states of affairs makes his theory inter-
esting. The notion of state of affairs can provide an answer to the ques-
tion of what we are directed to in our judgements about the past and the 
future. Although there is no object or complex left to judge about, there 
is still the ideal state of affairs that is the object of our judgement.
However, there seems to be a similar problem with relationships 
as there is with states of affairs: how can a relationship subsist, in 
case its members do not exist? And, how can a spatio-temporal object 
‘constitute’ an ideal object? How can an existing object ‘constitute’ a 
subsisting object?
Conclusion
In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski 
developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: 
existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay 
within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction 
between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduc-
tion of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano’s 
theory. His changes concerned judgements about relations and about 
non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational 
judgements. The existential judgements are analysed in a Brentanian 
way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way as 
far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object: the object 
of a relational judgement is a relationship. For Twardowski, a relational 
judgement is correct, if the relationship subsists; and the relationship 
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may subsist even if the objects that are related do not exist. With this 
notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept 
of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements, as it may later 
be found in the writings of other Brentano pupils, e.g., Meinong and 
Husserl. The theory is in fact more acceptable than Meinong’s, because 
Twardowski makes a distinction between the judgemental content and 
the judgemental object. However, Twardowski’s theory suffers from the 
same problem as every theory of judgement relying on states of affairs, 
as states of affairs are entities whose constitution is unclear.
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